Static competitive decision-making model is formalized as family of different noncooperative games. Each noncooperative game is defined for some project that required the adoption of a positive or negative decision by each of the players. The players' strategies are decisions about each of the project. The players' incomes are defined as the value of the players' payoff functions on the set of n-tuples from players' decisions for relevant projects. It's required to solve each of noncooperative games. Solving successively each of the noncooperative games, we get the set of optimal n-tuples for all noncooperative games. Then it's required to choice of the compromise solutions with help an algorithm of finding a compromise solution in order to emphasize the priority project (one or more). As an optimality principles are accepted Pareto optimum, Nash arbitration solution and compromise solution. Algorithm for finding optimal solution of static competitive model of decision-making is constructed. Existence of solution of static competitive model of decisionmaking is proved and numerical example is given.
Introduction
This paper refers to the decision-making theory [1] and to series of problems about best choice [2] - [5] . Within the framework of this theory in the paper a new mathematical model is proposed which is as follows.
Let the set of agents N and the set of projects M are given. Each agent fixes his participation or not participation in the project by one or zero choice. The participation in the project is connected with incomes or losses which the agents wants to maximize or minimize. Thus we have a problem to find project (one or more) with best in some sense incomes for agents. This gives us an optimization problem which can be modeled as game. This problem we call as static competitive model of decision-making.
Denote the players by i ∈ N and the projects by j ∈ M . Let n is number of players and m is number of projects. The family m of different noncooperative games are considered. In each game G j , j ∈ M, the player i has two strategies accept or reject the project. The payoff of the player in each game is determined by the strategies chosen by all players in this game G j .
The games G j , j ∈ M, are solved by using the Pareto optimal solution and Nash arbitration scheme. Then having the solutions of games G j , j ∈ M, we apply optimality principle "the compromise solution" [6] to select the best projectsj ∈ M .
In the papers [7] - [9] are considered some analogical models of decisionmaking for problem of investing with coalitional partitions. Consider the following examples of applications where this model can be applied.
1. Suppose we have a several innovative projects and a set of investors. We fix an innovative project. Each investor decides to participate in this project or not. Income of each investor are determined on a set of situations formed by decisions of all investors. We need to select an innovative project (one or more), which would be in some sense more attractive to investors.
2. Let in the legislature is proposed some versions of any bill which is discussed by legislators. In this example, the agents are the legislators, the projects are versions of the law, and the agents' strategies are the voting for versions of the law or against. Income of each legislator is determined by a set of situations formed decisions of all legislators for a fixed version of the bill. We must select one or more versions of the bill, which are the most fair and take into account all aspects of the negative consequences of the law came into force.
3. Consider a several building projects for the resettlement of tenants from any "dangerous" zone. Here, in order to avoid conflict the tenants need to decide about a new place of residence from several, and the real estate developers need to decide where to build a building. In this example, the agents are tenants, the project is the alleged location for building and agents' strategies are consent or refusal to resettle in the appropriate building.
In this paper the problem is illustrated by example of the interaction of three players.
State of the problem
Let N = {1 , . . . , n} is the set of players and M = {1 , . . . , m} is the set of projects that required the adoption of a positive or negative decision by each of the players.
Suppose: X i = {0 ; 1} is the set of pure strategies x i of player i , i = 1, n. The strategy x i can take the following values: x i = 0 as a negative decision for the some project and x i = 1 as a positive decision; x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) is the n-tuple of pure strategies chosen by the players;
X i is the set of n-tuples.
On the set n-tuples X for each project j , j = 1 , m, and for each player i, i = 1 , n, the payoff function K j i : X → R 1 is defined. The payoff vector of players will be denote by
. Thus, for some project j , j = 1 , m, we have noncooperative n-person game G j ( x):
By a solution of noncooperative n-person game G j ( x) , j = 1 , m, we mean the subset Pareto optimal n-tuples that we get from the Pareto optimal set using Nash arbitration scheme.
Remind the definition of Pareto optimal set (PO) and Nash arbitration solution (NB) [10] .
Definition 2.1
The n-tuplex = (x 1 , ...,x n ) in noncooperative n-person game is called Pareto optimum, if it's not exist any n-tuple x = (x 1 , ..., x n ):
Denote the Pareto optimal set byX :X ⊂ X.
Definition 2.2
The setX ⊂ X is called set of admissible results. Definition 2.3 Nash arbitration solutionx = (x 1 , ...,x n ) is called the solution of following optimization problem [10] :
Here: v = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) is the "status quo" point denoting outcome of noncooperative game, which the players guarantee for themselves; this point corresponds to the n-tuple x = (x 1 , ..., x n ):
As v i we use maximal guaranteed payoff of i-th player, defined by the characteristic function in cooperative n-person game [11] :
where x N \{i} = (x 1 , ..., x i−1 , x i+1 , ..., x n ) is the strategy of coalition N \ {i}. Let for each project j ∈ M the solutionx of noncooperative game G j (x) is found.
Definition 2.4 Compromise set is called the set
is payoff matrix of players in NB solutionx [6] - [9] .
Thus, compromise solution is the "most convenient" project. The measure "convenience" this project is defined by minimality from all maximal deviations of payoffs for all players for each individual project; where a deviation payoff is value of shortfall of payoff of player to the maximum possible payoff.
Definition 2.5
The full compromise set is called the set
where C l K (M ) is defined as follows:
The projectj ∈ Compr K (M ) is compromise solution for all players. Definition 2.6 By the static competitive model of decision-making Γ we will call the set of m noncooperative games G j (x), j = 1 , m, defining by the expression (1)
Definition 2.7 Under solution of static competitive model of decision-making we will understand the pair (x ,j), wherex is NB solution in noncooperative game Gj ( x) with compromise projectj. Definition 2.8 The payoff vector Kj (x) of players in n-tuple NB we will call compromise payoff vector of players.
Algorithm for solving the problem
We have the algorithm of solving of model:
2. Find the set of PO solutionsX in noncooperative game G j (x).
3. Find the set of NB solutionsx ∈X in noncooperative game G j (x).
4. Repeat the iterations 1-3 for all another projects j , j = 1 , m.
Find full compromise set of projectsj
Reformulated the theorem from [12] in the our notations. Proof. Really, according theorem 3.1, in noncooperative game with finite set of n-tuple X at least one PO n-tuple exist always. Nash arbitration solution on the non-empty set of PO solutions exist always also, because always maximum from discrete payoff function exist (def. 2.3). At last the full compromise set always not empty, because minimum and maximum from discrete payoff function exist always (def. 2.5).
Conclusion
A static competitive model of decision-making is formalized as the set of different noncooperative games. Each game is given for some project. Algorithm for finding optimal solution of static competitive model of decision-making is constructed. Existence of solution of static competitive model of decision-making is proved.
